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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Arbitration:
 A Positive Employment Tool and Potential Antidote to Class 
Actions
T
he use of arbitration for employment and other workplace disputes has been the topic of much 
controversy. In examining various aspects of arbitration, this paper proposes arbitration as a fair 
and appropriate process for responding to employees’ workplace issues. The value of arbitration 
is notable, particularly considering the potential costs of litigation. Even considering Wal-Mart 
v. Dukes, the 2011 Supreme Court decision which tightened the requirements for certifying a class in a 
class action, employers are concerned that the expense or judgments resulting from litigation will put 
an entire company at risk. From the employees’ stance, a major argument against arbitration is the 
perception that the process favors employers. Indeed some statistics show that employers do win most 
arbitration cases. However, employers generally settle legitimate grievances when possible, leaving the 
questionable cases to emerge into arbitration or litigation. Another source of unfairness for employees 
is the difficulty of finding counsel for arbitration, but this occurs largely because less money flows 
through the arbitration process. In sum, the analysis presented here presents arbitration as the fairest, 
most economical, and speediest procedure to properly address employees’ complaints if a settlement 
cannot be reached.
by Gregg A. Gilman and David Sherwyn
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CORNELL LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW REPORT
M
ore than two years have elapsed since employers let out a sigh of relief when the 
Supreme Court overturned the 9th Circuit decision in Wal-Mart v. Dukes and 
decertified the class of plaintiffs suing Wal-Mart, the nation’s largest employer, for sex 
discrimination.1 The class consisted of approximately 1.5 million of the retailer’s 
former and current female employees.2 While the details of the lower and Supreme Court decisions are 
beyond the scope of this paper, the lesson for many employers was the fear that class actions, regardless 
of merit, could put an entire company at risk. While the obvious response, “don’t violate the law,” should 
seemingly resolve that fear, the fact is that many employment lawsuits, such as wage and hour or 
discrimination cases, are often difficult to defend. This may occur because: (1) the law is unclear; (2) 
there are shades of gray in employment decisions, (3) it is difficult to ensure compliance in large multi-
state or multi-national corporations, or (4) sometimes companies face “bad facts” even when they did 
not violate the law. Although defending the allegations of one employee or even a group is expensive, 
most employers are able to do this. Defending a class action, however, often requires resources beyond 
what many employers can marshal. In this paper, we propose a way to avoid such costly litigation: 
arbitration.
1 131 S.Ct. 2541.
2 Id. at 2547.
Arbitration: 
A Positive Employment Tool 
and Potential Antidote to Class Actions 
by Gregg A. Gilman and David Sherwyn
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Arbitration of employment related lawsuits has been an 
alternative to litigation for employers since the early 1990s. 
Since that time the following four broad questions have sur-
rounded arbitration: (1) what is arbitration and is it fair?; (2) 
can employers require arbitration of employment lawsuits?; 
(3) can arbitration agreements prevent class actions?; and (4) 
should an employer implement an arbitration policy? This 
report addresses these four questions. Briefly, the answer to 
question 1 is discussed in the next section, which defines 
arbitration, the answer to questions 2 and 3 is yes, and the 
answer to question 4 depends on the employer’s situation, as 
we explain in the final section of the paper. After discussing 
the question of what is arbitration and whether it is fair, we 
explain the legal evolution that makes arbitration an option 
for employers who wish to trade litigation for arbitration and 
avoid class actions. Finally, we describe the employers who 
should, and should not, implement arbitration policies.
What Is Arbitration?
When discussing arbitration of employment disputes we are 
referring to mandatory “pre-dispute” arbitration. There is 
no dispute over whether post-dispute the parties to any case 
can choose to avoid the court system and arbitrate the case 
instead—but it is an extremely rare instance when both par-
ties to a dispute will choose arbitration over litigation once 
the dispute has occurred.3 Arbitration and litigation each 
offers its own particular set of advantages and disadvantages. 
This means that both sides will often agree that the arbitration 
seems to be a better process for dispute resolution before a 
dispute occurs. After the dispute arises, however, it is almost 
inevitable that one side will seek to exploit the advantages of 
litigation and will refuse to arbitrate.
Looking at the advantages and disadvantages of each, 
most knowledgeable observers will agree that the differences 
between arbitration and litigation can be put into three cat-
egories: (1) facts; (2) disputes over the time and cost; and (3) 
conjecture or opinion over fairness. 
Facts. Let’s start with the arbitration facts that everyone 
agrees on. First, arbitration is less formal than litigation.4 
Procedures that you would find in court are either relaxed or 
not in place at all. Instead, arbitration takes place in a confer-
ence room, not a court; arbitrators are not judges (e.g., there 
is no reason to stand when they enter the room); the rules of 
evidence are relaxed; and written documents need not comply 
with court rules with regard to font, margins, table of contents, 
and the numerous other requirements. This is why many em-
3 See: David Sherwyn, Because It Takes Two: Why Post-Dispute Voluntary 
Arbitration Programs Will Fail to Fix the Problems Associated with Employ-
ment Discrimination Law Adjudication, 24 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 1 
(2003).
4 David Sherwyn et. al., Assessing the Case for Employment Arbitration: A 
New Path for Empirical Research, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1557, 1575 (2005).
ployers whose employees pursue cases pro se will not have 
a lawyer present the case.5 Non-lawyers can be effective 
advocates in arbitration, while they are not permitted to 
play that role in court.
Second, arbitration is private,6 whereas litigation is 
public. Thus, unless the court seals the record, a rare occur-
rence, all allegations, briefs, depositions, and proceedings 
are part of the public record. Third, it is difficult to appeal 
an arbitration decision.7 In litigation, on the other hand, 
some appeals are automatic and, in some cases, the court 
of appeals examines the case de novo (taking a fresh look 
with no regard to the prior decision). In other cases, the 
appeals court can overturn a decision for a judicial error 
in law with regard to the substance (e.g., a misunderstand-
ing of what constitutes sexual harassment), evidence, or 
jury instructions. In contrast, to overturn arbitrations the 
moving party must prove one of “four specifically enumer-
ated situations. That is, the moving party must demonstrate 
corruption, fraud or undue means in procurement of the 
award, evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, 
specified misconduct on the arbitrators’ part, or [that] the 
arbitrators exceeded their powers.”8 The Second Circuit 
also recognizes an additional basis, manifest disregard of 
the law, to vacate an arbitration award.
Arbitration Is Faster and Less Expensive than 
Litigation
Because it is less formal, private, and difficult to appeal, ar-
bitration should be faster and less expensive than litigation. 
This conclusion is, however, disputed by some of arbitra-
tions’ proponents and critics.9 Most of those disputing the 
long-held belief that arbitration is faster and less expensive 
are those who were parties to arbitrations which took an 
exceedingly long time to conclude and cost substantial 
amounts of money for attorneys’ fees, experts, depositions, 
and, the added expense, the arbitrator. While there is anec-
dotal evidence contesting those long-held time and money 
beliefs, the empirical evidence supports the assertion that 
arbitration is, in fact, cost and time effective.10
5 Id.
6 Id. at 1562.
7 See id. at 1579.
8 DuBois v. Macy’s Retail Holdings, Inc., 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 20301, *2 
(2d Cir. Oct. 4, 2013.)
9 See: David S. Sherwyn, J. Bruce Tracey, & Zev J. Eigen, In Defense of 
Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing 
Out the Bath Water, and Constructing a New Sink in the Process, 2 U. Pa. 
J. Lab. & Emp. L. 73, 100 (1999) (stating that arbitration is less expensive 
than litigation partly because lawyers do not need to spend as much 
time to arbitrate as they would to litigate the facts of a court case).
10 See: David Sherwyn et. al., Assessing the Case for Employment Arbitra-
tion: A New Path for Empirical Research, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1557, 1567-78 
(2005).
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Several years ago, Lewis Maltby, president of the Na-
tional Workrights Institute, found that the average litigation 
case took nearly two years (679.5 days) to resolve, while the 
mean for arbitration was 8.6 months.11 Arbitration advo-
cates point to a shorter time period as a positive aspect of ar-
bitration. Again, the data studied arise out of cases that were 
actually litigated or arbitrated and not the thousands that 
are resolved before the formal filings. Unlike the win–loss 
comparisons, there is little empirical controversy: arbitration 
is faster than litigation. 
In fact, Maltby’s study actually underestimates the time 
difference between the two forms of adjudication. Maltby 
analyzed resolutions not trials.12 Accordingly, Maltby’s data 
include motions which reduce the time period at issue for 
litigation, but do not really affect arbitration, where disposi-
tive motions are rare. In Maltby’s data set, 60 percent of the 
“litigated” cases were resolved through a motion (and the 
employer won 98 percent of those cases).13 Thus, Maltby 
was comparing arbitrations; where the parties almost always 
had the opportunity to present their cases, against litigation, 
where 60 percent of cases were decided by court on a motion 
alone. Even with motions providing a built in “time advan-
tage,” cases in litigation still took 2½ times as long as those 
in arbitration to be resolved.
In a more recent study, Eisenberg and Hill compared 
arbitrations and trials, unlike Maltby’s focus on resolutions.14 
They separated civil rights cases from other employment 
claims in the arbitration and state court data, but their fed-
eral court data included both. Based on 172 cases, Eisenberg 
and Hill found that the average amount of time to adjudicate 
a non-civil rights case was 250 days.15 The 42 AAA civil 
rights arbitration cases that they studied took, on average, 
276 days.16 The mean time for state court non-discrimina-
tion trials was 723 days (N = 170), state court discrimina-
tion trials, 818 (N = 163); and federal court trials, 709 days 
(N  = 1,430).17 Thus, as expected, when deleting motions, 
the disparity between time to arbitrate versus litigate is even 
greater.
The comparative cost of arbitration and litigation is 
more challenging to pin down. Litigation costs vary widely, 
11 Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil 
Rights, 30 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 29, 55 (1998).
12 Id.
13 Id. at 47.
14 Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Employment Arbitration and 
Litigation: An Empirical Comparison (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, Public Law 
and Legal Theory Paper Series, Research Paper No. 65, 2003).
15 Id. at 19-20.
16 Id.
17 Id.
because a party’s counsel’s rate and staffing will have a huge 
effect on the cost of adjudication. Still, it stands to reason 
that extensive discovery, motions, jury instructions, and 
other procedures inherent in litigation will increase costs 
and fees as compared to the more straightforward process of 
arbitration.
Fairness of Arbitration 
The biggest dispute over arbitration is fairness. The is-
sue here is that most employment law scholars and other 
employee advocates contend that arbitration is unfair to 
employees.18 While statistics do appear to support this con-
clusion, we note that these data are flawed. What is missing 
in the data is a baseline of the percentage of cases that have 
merit. Lacking such a baseline, scholars compare arbitra-
tion results with litigation results. If they find higher success 
rates in litigation they immediately contend that arbitration 
is unfair, but this comparison does not account for cases 
without merit. If we had such a baseline of meritorious cases, 
we could compare the two systems against the “right” answer, 
but this is not possible. 
Scholars have compared litigation win rates to arbitra-
tion win rates.19 Some of these studies include dispositive 
motions (where employers win 98 percent those granted) 
and some don’t include those motions. Studies that exclude 
motions are inherently flawed, because they compare litiga-
tion that survived summary judgment against arbitration 
cases where there was no motion filter. There are other 
reasons why “bad” arbitration cases pollute the data. One ex-
ample is the pro se policy we mentioned, that is, under many 
employer arbitration policies the company will not bring a 
lawyer if the employee also does not bring one.20 Thus, there 
are a large number of arbitrations where the employee is 
pro se. It is difficult for an employee to take a case to federal 
court pro se. Thus, cases in litigation, before surviving mo-
tions must survive another test: whether a plaintiff ’s lawyer 
will invest time and money in the case. Plaintiffs’ lawyers are 
rational actors who have no incentive to take cases with a 
low probability for success and thus, they weed out bad cases.
18 See, e.g.: Alexander Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment Arbitra-
tion: Clarity Amidst the Sound and Fury?, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y 
J. 405, 406 & n.3 (2007) (citing Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory 
Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of 
the 1990s, 73 Denver U. L. Rev. 1017, 1019–20 (1996).
19 See e.g.: William M. Howard, Arbitrating Claims of Employment 
Discrimination: What Really Does Happen? What Really Should Happen?, 
Disp. Resol. J., Oct.-Dec. 1995, at 40; Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, 
Employment Arbitration and Litigation: An Empirical Comparison (N.Y. 
Univ. Sch. of Law, Public Law and Legal Theory Paper Series, Research 
Paper No. 65, 2003).
20 See: David Sherwyn et. al., Assessing the Case for Employment Arbitra-
tion: A New Path for Empirical Research, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1557, 1586 (2005).
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Finally, we contend that employers who have imple-
mented companywide arbitration policies should never lose, 
and indeed for some employers that is the case. The reason 
for this assertion is twofold. First, mandatory arbitration 
policies typically include a grievance process that precedes 
arbitration and includes a mediation step.21 After hearing 
the employees’ cases during the grievance and mediation 
steps, the employer has a good idea of the facts of the case. 
At this point the employer’s counsel or HR professional deci-
sion maker should be able to judge whether an employee’s 
claim can succeed before an arbitrator or any trier of fact. 
(In that regard, we note that a decision maker who makes 
the wrong call will not be the decision maker much longer.) 
More to the point, employers, their lawyers, and their HR 
professionals are risk averse.22 Settling a case to avoid the 
cost of defense or the fear of a ruling not supported by the 
facts is a perfectly acceptable cost of doing business. With 
that in mind, suppose we separate the world of cases into 
three categories: (1) dead bang winners for the employee; 
(2) cases that could go either way; and (3) dead bang win-
ners for the employer. We contend that the vast majority of 
employers with mandatory arbitration provisions only take 
the third category to arbitration and thus, their success rate 
often is, and, should be, extremely high. The employee advo-
cate scholars ignore this argument and, instead, focus on the 
so-called repeat player effect.
Several scholars have made a career out of showing that 
repeat player employers fare better than single player em-
ployers.23 These scholars suggest that arbitrators are biased 
in favor of those who may hire them again. These scholars 
predicate their wholesale attack on a pillar of employment 
relations policy, arbitration, by arguing that unions provide 
a check on arbitrators’ inherent lack of integrity and thus, 
without this check, arbitrators will follow the money regard-
less of the facts and their own professional standards. It is 
somewhat amazing that without anything more than results 
that may be just (again there is no baseline), these scholars 
attack the entire profession of labor and employment neu-
trals as people who have no professional integrity and who, 
21 Alexander Colvin, Employment Arbitration: Empirical Findings and 
Research Needs, 64-Oct Disp. Resol. J. 6, 11 (2009) (showing that compa-
nies adopt “internal grievance procedures, such as internal management 
appeals boards, mediation, or peer review” preceding arbitration).
22 See generally: Scott Baker, A Risk-Based Approach to Mandatory Arbi-
tration, 83 OR. L. REV. 861 (2004).
23 See, e.g.: Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player 
Effect, 1 Emp. Rts. & Emp. Pol’y J. 189 (1997); Lisa B. Bingham, Is There a 
Bias in Arbitration of Nonunion Employment Disputes? An Analysis of Ac-
tual Cases and Outcomes, 6 Int’l J. Conflict Mgmt. 369 (1995); and Lisa B. 
Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics 
in Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 McGeorge L. Rev. 
223 (1998).
instead, see each case as opportunity to build a résumé that 
will convince the employer to choose them again.
One counter to this argument is, what about the 
plaintiffs’ bar, that is, the attorneys who regularly represent 
employees? The employee advocate scholars dismiss the role 
of the plaintiffs’ bar as if plaintiffs’ lawyers have no role in 
choosing arbitrators or keeping them honest.24 An interest-
ing question arises: Why do plaintiffs’ lawyers fail to play the 
role of the union in employment arbitration? The answer is 
that they refuse to take these cases. The follow-up question 
is, why do plaintiffs’ lawyers oppose arbitration? After all, ar-
bitrators have been resolving employment disputes for more 
than half a century. It is faster and less expensive to arbitrate 
than to litigate, which should mean that plaintiffs’ lawyers 
would have an incentive to take these cases and provide the 
counter to the employer in the arbitrator selection process.
The reason that this does not occur can be found by 
looking at arbitration cases in the financial services industry. 
Highly compensated employees in that industry have no 
trouble finding counsel to arbitrate their cases, but those 
earning middle class wages are less likely to find willing 
counsel. 
We contend that plaintiffs’ lawyers are incentivized by 
two features of litigation: (1) cost of defense and (2) unpre-
dictable juries. In this discussion, we in no way disparage 
plaintiffs’ lawyers. Unlike arbitrators who, by definition, are 
supposed to fair and impartial, plaintiffs’ lawyers do not owe 
such a duty to be “just.” Plaintiffs’ lawyers are advocates who 
can take or refuse cases at will, and once they have accepted 
the case they will do their best to prevail. But a lawyer has 
no obligation to take a case that limits damages even when 
it has clear liability. As a practical matter, a series of such 
decisions will put the lawyer out of business. Moreover, 
judges have apparently grown increasingly frustrated with 
lawyers who bring “fees cases”—cases where the fees greatly 
outweigh the damages.
Another issue involves employers’ view of potential 
employee suits. The costs of defending cases in court and 
employers’ fear of runaway juries often convince employers 
to settle cases that they would otherwise adjudicate before 
an arbitrator.25 The fact that arbitration for low- or medium-
wage employees does not provide a financial windfall for 
plaintiffs’ lawyers does not mean that the system is unjust 
or that employers should be vilified for choosing arbitration. 
Instead, employers can, and often do, use arbitration as the 
center piece of their labor relations program.
24 See: Bingham (1997), supra.
25 See: Sherwyn et. al. (2005), supra.
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Next, let’s examine an alternative scenario, one that 
includes arbitration. In a workplace in which employees 
contracted away their right to file a class action, say that a 
plaintiff ’s lawyer invested the time and energy to discover a 
class-wide violation. At this point, the lawyer would file an 
arbitration demand and arbitrate the best claim first, per-
haps, or depending upon the terms of the arbitration agree-
ment, aggregate any other claims into a class-wide arbitra-
tion. If class-wide arbitration is not permitted, the plaintiffs’ 
lawyer may elect to arbitrate the same claim over and over 
at the employer’s expense. With genuine classes, this may be 
so inefficient that it may increase the odds that an employer 
agrees to treat the putative group of employees as a class. 
In a situation like this, employers may not regard a class 
action ban as a true advantage if they have to arbitrate the 
same issue hundreds of times. If the first arbitration yielded 
a pro-employee decision the employer would not want to 
repeatedly arbitrate the same claim. The first case would not 
entail the class certification issue, would not result in huge 
amounts of attorney time, and could be adjudicated instead 
of settled. The employee would not have to use her award 
to pay for the lawyer’s time. Instead, the lawyer would have 
her hourly fee (as determined by the court and paid by the 
employer) and maybe a small percentage of the award. Sub-
sequent arbitration cases would likely be settled by focusing 
exclusively on the employee’s lost wages because the legal 
issue would be settled. The employer would pay what it owes, 
the employee would get what she deserves, and the plain-
tiffs’ lawyers would lose a boondoggle. In short, reduced 
transactional costs associated with arbitration actually make 
repeat arbitration of class-wide violations more likely to 
yield a greater percentage of available surplus funds to go to 
wronged employees as compared to attorneys and experts. 
Employees may thus be better off waiving their right to class 
actions in many cases, and using arbitration as a lever to 
gain de facto class status, but with a greater potential yield of 
available damages.
The Law of Arbitration
As we said, the simple answer to whether mandatory arbitra-
tion is lawful and can prevent class actions is yes. The evolu-
tion of the law is complex, however. Let’s briefly examine the 
procedure under which the law developed, beginning about 
forty years ago. In almost all cases since then, the employer 
has had an arbitration policy but the employee’s counsel 
filed a lawsuit in court despite the policy. The employer then 
would file a motion to compel arbitration and the court 
would have to decide whether to keep the case or defer it 
not get health insurance, and as a pragmatic decision because it could 
take years to actually litigate the case. Although a judge suspended the 
agreement pending further information, the fact remains that the court 
had ordered mediation, and a hearing appeared to be the last resort.
Class Actions
Arbitration is particularly popular among employers because 
of recent Supreme Court decisions allowing employers’ 
arbitration policies to prohibit collective or class actions.26 
Unlike the litigation versus arbitration trade-off, this pro-
hibition is not simply a forum or process change. Instead, it 
does take away a tool that could be used by plaintiffs. The 
question is whether this represents a problem for employees 
in terms of achieving a fair resolution of workplace disputes.
While the litany of publicized wage and hour class 
action settlements supports the view that class actions are 
an effective tool for employees who have been wronged by 
employers, a closer look shows that class action settlements 
are, in fact, a boon for plaintiffs’ lawyers and tend to provide 
little compensatory relief to the employees themselves. Two 
questions arise in this context. First, are employees harmed 
by the lack of class actions?, and second, are class actions the 
optimal way to address systemic legal violations?
Let’s begin with a look at the typical pattern of a class 
action. Seasoned class action lawyers on both sides know 
that there is a rhythm to employment class actions. The 
number one priority for plaintiffs’ lawyers is the potential 
for a large damage award against a deep-pocketed employer. 
Next, the parties battle over the certification of the class. At 
this point, the plaintiffs’ lawyers have a large investment in 
the case, which they typically have accepted on a contingent-
fee basis. Defense lawyers shift to damage control at this 
point. They work to knock out certain aspects of the claim 
to make the settlement numbers manageable. This posturing 
increases the plaintiffs’ lawyers’ investments in their cases, 
increases their costs, and thus, increases the amount of fees 
they need to recoup.27
When the parties finally settle, the employer is 
comfortable with the damage award and the plaintiffs’ 
lawyers sell the settlement to the employees. Are the 
employees justly compensated for their lost wages? Are they 
happy with the award? We have never seen these empirical 
questions addressed by researchers. Instead, the contention 
that eliminating class actions is hurtful to employees is made 
in a vacuum and without comparison to potential relief 
through arbitration.28
26 See: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
27 Indeed, at Georgetown Law School’s Hospitality Law Conference 
(10/25/13 Washington, DC) four seasoned management lawyers, all labor 
and employment department chairs, Gregg Gilman (Davis & Gilbert), 
Carolyn Richmond (Fox Rothschild), David Ritter (Barnes & Thornburg), 
and Paul Wagner (Stokes, Wagner) stated that in their extensive collective 
experience, class action settlements generally revolved around plaintiffs’ 
lawyers’ fees, and the amount of money that most employees would 
recover bordered on inconsequential.
28 The National Football League recently settled a lawsuit in which play-
ers sought redress for concussions and other physical and mental injuries. 
The media reported the settlement as acceptable to the players, who did 
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Court held, there was Supreme Court precedent to enforce 
arbitration of statutory rights as long as the statute did not 
expressly prohibit arbitration.33 It must be noted that Gilmer 
does not prevent an employee from filing a claim with the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or any other 
administrative agency and it cannot prevent that agency 
from filing a claim on behalf of the employee.
Gilmer made two more arguments that the Court 
rejected. First, Gilmer argued that the arbitration was unfair 
because in some cases: (1) there are no written opinions; 
(2) the employee does not get to choose the arbitrator; (3) 
damages are less than that provided in court; (4) discovery is 
limited; (5) the employee’s decision to sign the contract is not 
knowing and voluntary; and (6) the employment contract 
was not covered by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). 
The Court rejected the first three of these arguments 
not because these “defects” would make a policy unfair and 
therefore unenforceable, but because the NYSE polices 
provided for written opinions, choice of arbitrator, and dam-
ages equal to that in court. The Court rejected the discovery 
argument because the point of arbitration is that it should be 
quicker and less expensive than litigation, so limited discov-
ery was not only acceptable, it was part of the process. With 
regard to the “knowing and voluntary” contention, the Court 
held that a take it or leave it policy is effectively voluntary. 
The unequal bargaining power in this situation does not 
make signing the contract involuntary, since the employee 
could walk away from the employment offer. Last, the FAA 
does instruct courts to enforce arbitration agreements and 
does exclude employment contracts for employees engaged 
in industries affecting international or interstate commerce. 
Gilmer argued that the FAA’s language excluded all employ-
ment contracts, while the employer argued that the exception 
was limited to employees in the transportation industry. The 
Gilmer Court did not rule on the issue because since the 
NYSE was not the employer the contract was not an employ-
ment contract, excluded from coverage under the FAA. Thus, 
after Gilmer there were two main issues—what is a fair agree-
ment and what is the effect of the FAA.
In the next twenty years, the courts defined what is 
fair and the effect of the FAA. The effect of the FAA is eas-
ily described. In Circuit City v. Adams, the Supreme Court 
held that Congressional intent behind the phrase “seamen, 
railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in 
foreign or interstate commerce” was limited to the trans-
portation industry and that commerce did not have the 
widespread meaning that is ascribed to it today.34 Thus, any 
employer outside the transportation industry can implement 
an arbitration policy as long as it is fair.
33 Id. at 34-5.
34 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 105, 115 (2001).
to arbitration. This scenario is somewhat different than the 
first Supreme Court case that addressed the issue.
In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, a 1973 case, the em-
ployee, who was a union member, was fired and arbitrated 
his grievance under his union contract.29 At the arbitra-
tion the employee alleged that the employer terminated 
the employee because of his race. The arbitrator denied 
the grievance and held there was cause for termination. 
Subsequently, the employee filed a race case in federal 
court, where the employer argued that arbitration was the 
exclusive forum for the dispute and, regardless of that, the 
employee had chosen to go to arbitration and was not en-
titled to the proverbial second bite of the apple. The United 
States Supreme Court rejected the employer’s argument and 
found that arbitration did not preclude the employee from a 
subsequent lawsuit.30 The basis for the Court’s decision was 
twofold. First, the Court held that while arbitration was fine 
for contract rights (that is, the just cause provision in the 
union contract), it was not appropriate for statutory rights 
(in this case, anti-discrimination law). Second, the Court 
held that union arbitration provisions were inappropriate 
for resolving discrimination lawsuits because the union 
“owned” the grievance, not the employee and, because the 
union by definition was supposed to focus on the good of 
the whole, the individual case could get lost. Most lawyers 
and scholars took the holding of Gardner-Denver to mean 
that pre-dispute mandatory arbitration would not prevent 
an employee from pursuing a statutory claim in court. This 
lasted until 1991, when the Gilmer case was decided.
In Gilmer v. Johnson Interstate, the employee had to 
sign an arbitration agreement as part of accepting a position 
that involved working on the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE).31 The NYSE agreement provided that all disputes 
arising out of employment would be adjudicated before an 
arbitrator and thus precluded the employees from filing 
cases in court. After two years of employment, the company 
fired Gilmer, who filed an age discrimination case in federal 
court. The employer filed a motion to compel arbitration 
and the issue was once again ripe, but this time the result 
was different.
The Gilmer court enforced the motion to compel 
arbitration and distinguished Gilmer from Gardner-Denver 
because Gilmer’s contract was an individual contract and 
not a union contract.32 The fact that Gilmer’s case was a 
statutory right did not affect the decision because, as the 
29 415 U.S. 36.
30 Id. at 50.
31 500 U.S. 20.
32 After Gilmer it seemed that arbitrations in union contracts could not 
prevent litigation. This changed in 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 
247 (2009).
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With regard to fairness, most jurisdictions simply exam-
ine the substance of the policy and determine whether it is 
fair. Because “what is fair” varies by jurisdiction, employers 
should not draft arbitration agreements without experienced 
employment law counsel.35 Still, the threshold rules from 
Gilmer (i.e., written opinions, statutory damages, choice 
of arbitrator, some discovery, and knowing and voluntary) 
are essential. In drafting arbitration policies, other topics to 
consider include the claims subject to arbitration, mutual-
ity, cost arrangements, opt-outs, statute of limitations, use 
of attorneys, pre-arbitration mediation and other dispute 
resolution steps, and all available remedies. All in all, for 
the last ten years, employers with experienced employment 
counsel have been able to draft policies that will ensure that 
their employment lawsuits will be resolved in arbitration not 
litigation.36
Class Actions
At the time of the Gilmer decision, wage and hour issues 
were something that most management law firms funneled 
to one or two associates and most companies rarely thought 
about. In the last ten years wage and hour class actions have 
become “bet the company” lawsuits for restaurants and 
clubs, and a serious source of concern for hotels. As the 
wage and hour issues became more prevalent, employers 
with an arbitration policy faced the difficult decision as to 
whether to exclude class actions from the policy, allow class 
actions in the arbitration forum, or to try to use the policy to 
prohibit class actions.
Arbitrating class actions greatly concerned employers 
because the same features that make arbitration attractive 
in the single employee discrimination cases (i.e., limited 
discovery and appeals, and relaxed rules of evidence) made 
it terrifying in class actions. Under federal law, punitive 
damages in discrimination cases are limited to $300,000 per 
35 The advisory board of the Cornell Institute for Hospitality Labor & 
Employment Relations features eleven labor and employment lawyers 
who are all experienced in drafting, implementing, litigating, and arbitrat-
ing these policies.
36 California is different. In California, contracts are unenforceable if 
they are procedurally and substantively unconscionable. In Circuit City 
Stores, Inc. v. Adams (Adams III), 279 F.3d 889, 896 (9th Cir. 2002), the 
Ninth Circuit, applying California law, held that “take or leave it” clauses 
are procedurally unconscionable. Next, the court, still applying California 
law, held that policy was substantively unconscionable because it limited 
damages and did not require mutuality. In other words, employees were 
required to arbitrate, but employers could litigate. The court then refused 
to enforce Circuit City’s policy because it failed both tests. In Circuit City 
Stores, Inc. v. Ahmed, 283 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2002), however, the Ninth 
Circuit held that an “opt-out” option (i.e., the employee was covered by 
the arbitration policy but had 30 days to opt out) was not unconscionable. 
Thus, in California employers can have “unfair” policies as long as there 
is an opt-out. This is a safe way to ensure enforcement. Employers who 
do not wish to have an opt-out clause need to make sure that experienced 
counsel analyzes their policy with regard to substantive unconscionability.
plaintiff.37 Thus, while a rogue arbitration decision could 
certainly hurt a company, there was an order of magnitude 
difference between that and a wage and hour class action 
where tens of millions of dollars could be at stake. The safe 
bet for employers was to prohibit class actions and hope the 
courts enforced the policy. This is exactly what happened.
The major cases addressing whether arbitration provi-
sions can prevent class actions are not in the employment 
context, but instead mostly involve consumer matters. In 
AT&T v. Concepcion, for instance, the service contract 
required arbitration of all disputes and prohibited class 
actions.38 In overturning both provisions, the district court 
and the Ninth Circuit held that a party to an arbitration 
agreement cannot get around its agreement to arbitrate 
individually and instead demand a class action.39 Likewise, 
in American Express Co v. Italian Colors Restaurant, the 
arbitration agreement again prohibited class actions.40 The 
merchant argued that any monetary damages that a single 
merchant could obtain in an arbitration over credit card 
fees would not exceed the costs of the arbitration and thus, a 
class action should be allowed. The Supreme Court held that 
the fact that the amount an individual could recover was too 
low to warrant pursuing a claim does not invalidate a class 
action waiver in an arbitration agreement. The Court contin-
ued by holding that courts must “rigorously enforce” arbitra-
tion agreements according to their terms, even for claims 
that allege a violation of federal statute, unless the FAA’s 
mandate has been “overridden by a contrary congressional 
command.”41 This ruling is applicable to the hospitality in-
dustry, because in many cases the amount of an individual’s 
wage and hour claim is not worth the cost of arbitration. The 
Italian Colors holding legitimizes an employer’s policy in 
such cases. Thus, the law is clear—employers, with the help 
of counsel, can implement mandatory arbitration policies 
which will ensure that all individual cases will be arbitrated 
and that there will be no class actions. As a final point in this 
report, we examine whether employers should do this.
Should Employers Implement Mandatory 
Arbitration Policies?
As a starting point, we propose that an arbitration policy 
goes hand in hand with a good-conscience effort to fol-
low all relevant employment laws. Thus, employers should 
37 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (West).
38 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
39 Id.
40 133 S.Ct. 2304 (2013).
41 Id. at 2306-8. The Supreme Court did state that an arbitration agree-
ment would be unenforceable if it prohibited the assertion of certain 
statutory rights or had administrative or filing fees making the forum 
impractical. Id. at 2310.
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implement mandatory arbitration policies only if they also 
work hard to comply with the various labor and employment 
laws. Contrary to the argument that arbitration is a method 
used by employers who wish to violate the law, the fact is 
that arbitration has fewer barriers to entry, which means 
that employees with good claims are more likely to pursue 
those claims.42 Moreover, with arbitration, employers can-
not benefit from the delays inherent in the EEOC and state 
agency process. These delays often force wronged employees 
to settle for nuisance amounts or to simply walk away. Under 
arbitration, employees will get their “day in court” within six 
to nine months—less time than it takes the EEOC to assign 
an investigator in a litigation case.43 Once there is a hear-
ing, employers cannot “big firm” employees in arbitration 
because discovery and motions are limited.44 The arbitrator 
will want to get the case heard and will not let the employer 
“process” the employee to exhaustion. Even class claims will 
be heard for the first individual and then, if the employer is 
liable, there will be an avalanche of arbitrations.
Our contention is that employers who work hard to 
comply with the seemingly endless labor and employment 
laws and regulations will greatly benefit. The cost of defense 
42 Richard A. Bales, Normative Consideration of Employment Arbitration 
at Gilmer’s Quinceanera, 81 Tul. L. Rev. 331, 355-358 (2006) (citing Eliza-
beth Hill, AAA Employment Arbitration: A Fair Forum at Low Cost, Disp. 
Resol. J., May-July 2003, at 8, 9).
43 Id. at 343. (“Disposition time unequivocally favors arbitration. Lewis 
Maltby has found that the average litigated employment discrimination 
case took 679.5 days—nearly two years—to resolve, while the average 
arbitration case took only 8.6 months.” (citing Lewis L. Maltby, Private 
Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. 
Rev. 29, 55 (1998)).
44 Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, When Is Cost an Unlawful Barrier to 
Alternative Dispute Resolution? The Ever Green Tree of Mandatory Employ-
ment Arbitration, 50 UCLA L. Rev. 143, 161-63 (2002).
will no longer drive cases. Plaintiffs’ lawyers, who take cases 
based on the depth of the employer’s pockets and their 
susceptibility to negative publicity, do not pursue arbitration 
cases. Moreover, like many of the current arbitration users, 
employers can make arbitration a centerpiece of their em-
ployment relations programs. These employers can commu-
nicate to their employees that the company wishes to resolve 
disputes in a timely non-adversarial way by having a policy 
that has a several step grievance policy, provides for media-
tion, and ends in arbitration. We have already noted that 
some employers will not send counsel if the employee is pro 
se. Other employers provide funds to hire a lawyer (again, 
the cost is much lower). Still others trade employment-at-
will for arbitration under the theory that they only discharge 
and discipline for cause, so why not implement arbitration?
In the end, well-meaning employees and employers 
are better off if they have an alternative dispute resolution 
program that corrects problems and resolves disputes. The 
research shows that these employers will not reduce the 
number of disputes and will not increase their win–loss 
records.45 They will, however, greatly reduce outside counsel 
fees and greatly reduce the amount of time that a case lingers. 
The reduction in time reduces damages because the less time 
results in less back pay and, because the plaintiffs’ lawyers 
have less time invested, settlements are no longer driven by 
attorney’s fees. Most important, employers with arbitration 
policies find that employees with disputes work to resolve 
the dispute and stay employed—something that is almost 
unheard of in the world of litigation. This, of course, reduces 
turnover costs and has a positive effect on morale. Because 
of the class action waiver and the numerous other benefits, it 
is time for “good” employers to consider arbitration.   n
45 See Sherwyn, supra note 4.
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